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COVID-19 and Xi Jinping’s 
Fight and Win Strategy: 
Implications for China 
Amrita Jash
What we [China] fought was a people’s war against the outbreak. We 
have put up a strenuous struggle and made tremendous sacrifices. Now 
the situation in China is moving steadily in a positive direction. Life and 
work are quickly returning to normal. Yet, there is no way we will lower 
our guard or relax control.
—Chinese President Xi Jinping, March 26, 20201
 On January 28, 2020, in a meeting with the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) Director-General Tedros dhanom Ghebreyesus on the spread 
of novel coronavirus epidemic in Wuhan (the capital of central China’s 
Hubei province), Chinese President Xi Jinping remarked, saying, “The 
epidemic is a devil. We will not let it hide.”2 Furthermore, Xi affirmed 
that China has full confidence and capability to win the battle against the 
virus outbreak. As noted, on March 10 at Wuhan, Xi declared: “Victory 
for Wuhan, victory for Hubei, and victory for China!”3 What is striking 
to note, as China declared its win over the epidemic, WHO on March 11, 
declared COVID-19 as a global “pandemic.”4 
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Table 1: Trajectory of the Development of Coronavirus from nCov 
to COVID-19 (December 2019-March 2020)
Date Response
December 29, 2019 Chinese authorities identified a cluster of similar pneumonia 
cases of unknown aetiology in Wuhan
December 31, 2019 China first reported to the WHO Country Office about 
the pneumonia of an unknown cause
January 30, 2020 WHO declared the outbreak as a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern
February 11, 2020 WHO named the new coronavirus disease as COVID-19
March 11, 2020 WHO announced COVID-19 as a “global pandemic”
March 17, 2020 WHO Reported: Globally Confirmed cases: 179,111; 
Total Deaths: 7,426
March 25, 2020 WHO Reported: Globally Confirmed Cases: 414,179; 
Total Deaths: 18,440
March 27, 2020 WHO Reported: Globally Confirmed Cases: 512,701; 
Total Deaths: 23,495
March 29, 2020 WHO Reported: Globally Confirmed Cases: 575,444; 
Total Deaths: 26,654; Total affected countries, areas or 
territories: 201
March 30, 2020 WHO Reported: Globally Confirmed Cases: 638,146; 
Total Deaths: 30,105; Total affected countries, areas or 
territories: 202
WHO Reported: Globally Confirmed Cases: 697,244; 
Total Deaths: 33,257; Total affected countries, areas or 
territories: 203
Source: Compiled by the Author in consultation with data available at WHO Website.5
However, what called for this change in perception is the transition 
of the epicentre from Wuhan-China to that of Italy in Europe. This was 
followed by rapid outbreaks in Iran, Spain and United States (US)—the 
new epicentres of the pandemic, as outlined in Table 2 below.
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Table 2: Major Epicentres of COVID-19 Worldwide  
(as of March 31, 2020)
Country Total Confirmed Cases Total Deaths
China 82,455 3,313
Italy 97,689 10,781
United States of America 122,653 2,112
Spain 78,787 6,528
Iran 41,495 2,757
Source: Compiled by the Author in consultation with data available at WHO Website.6
What is noteworthy is the trend of duality over impressions of 
COVID-19 figures between China and the rest of the world. That is, on 
one end, the number of new cases in China witnesses a downturn despite 
its significant population size of 1.4 billion; on the other end, the sum of 
cases of all other countries badly affected exhibit an exponential growth 
that exceeded China. As noted, China’s share of new cases has dropped 
from being more than 90 per cent to that of becoming one per cent.7 
What explains this sharp fall of COVID-19 cases in China?
Such a discrepancy demands significant attention and calls for 
speculations over China’s transparency in releasing its COVID-19 
figures. To suggest, with such voids at play, the pertinent query 
remains: Did Xi succeed in winning the battle against COVID-19? 
The answer remains “No,” as China has been able to slow the spread 
of the virus, but has failed to contain it. To argue so, as the outbreak 
that started in Wuhan in December 2019 rapidly emerged into a global 
pandemic by March 2020 resulting in greater damage beyond China, 
as noted in Figure 1.
The graph denotes the rapid outbreak of the pandemic—suggesting 
the increasing uncertainty over prevention and control of COVID-19. 
However, China with its “Wuhan win” thinks otherwise, as highlighted in 
its promotion of the idea that “COVID-19 can and will be contained.”9 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Growth of COVID-19 Cases Globally  
(January 22-March 29, 2020)
 Source: WHO.8
In doing so, China fails to address the key factor “by when” it will and 
“how” it will be contained. In this context, Xi’s “victory call” can be 
argued to be more “symbolic than significant”—upholding the image of 
a “strong, confident and responsible” China.
In view of this, the paper seeks to address two key aspects: What 
explains the Chinese understanding of “win” over COVID-19? Second, 
what are the implications of the pandemic on China at large and Xi 
Jinping, in particular? 
Ground Zero at Wuhan: How China Fought  
the COVID-19 Battle?
On March 19, China for the first time reported “zero domestically-
transmitted COVID-19 cases” in Wuhan,10 and as of March 31, China 
has reported 771 imported cases (mostly Chinese nationals returning 
from abroad),11 as per the data of China’s National Health Commission 
shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
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Figure 2: Downward Trend of COVID-19 Cases in Mainland 
China (January 21-March 30, 2020)
Source: CGTN.12
Figure 3: Trend of Imported Cases in Mainland China  
(March 16-30, 2020)
Source: CGTN.13
Given its progression, Chinese government declared to lift the 
lockdown of Wuhan, as imposed since January 23—removing the 
restrictions on outbound travel.15 Does this signify that China is set free of 
the COVID-19 challenge? To some extent; however, the current challenge 
lies in controlling the infections imported from overseas as well as that of 
a relapse of recovered cases—which call for red alarms for the future.16 To 
quell the risk, on March 
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Figure 4: Cumulative Growth in Number of Imported Cases in 
Mainland China (March 16-30, 2020)
Source: CGTN.14
28, Chinese Foreign Ministry temporarily suspended the entry of foreigners 
with valid Chinese visas or residence permits.17 
In this context, it becomes imperative to understand the Chinese 
perception of COVID-19 and the ways China dealt with the epidemic. In 
Chinese view, COVID-19 epidemic has been:
“a major public health emergency” considered to have spread fastest, 
caused the most extensive infection and have been the hardest to contain 
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.18
Owing to this perception, Xi Jinping called for a “people’s war” in 
fighting the epidemic, with Wuhan and Hubei as the main battlefield. China 
claims to have “turned the tide,” by its fighting strategy under the acronym 
“PROTECT”—Party leadership, “Renmin” for the people, Openness and 
transparency, Technology and science, Early treatment, Cooperation with 
the international community, and Targeted and agile approach.19 With 
these measures, China perceives that COVID-19 epidemic situation has 
been “stabilised” in a “short period of time.”20 What contributes to this 
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Chinese perception? China traces its success story to the “seven things 
China has done right to battle coronavirus”—taking full responsibility, 
mass mobilisation, political determination, timely policy adjustment, easing 
economic pain while fighting the disease, transparency with coordinated 
action and power of science and technology.21 To explain: 
First, the political determination of the CPC leadership under the 
command of Xi Jinping. As noted, on January 25, the meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) Central Committee chaired by Xi Jinping formed the 
Central Leading Group for Epidemic Response.22 Furthermore, the 
Party also dispatched a central guiding team as well as demanded a State 
Council inter-agency task force to play its full role in coordination.23 
While Premier Li Keqiang headed the Central Leading Group, Vice 
Premier Sun Chunlan oversaw the work on the ground in Hubei 
province.24 These measures highlight the supremacy of the Party in 
China’s decision-making, which Chinese leadership seek to uphold at all 
circumstances. 
Second, draconian measures were adopted to prevent and control 
the spread of the virus. In doing so, on January 23, China locked down 
Wuhan—the epicentre, where 10 million people live—and also imposed 
full and strict control over the outbound population flow across Hubei, 
which has 60 million people. This called for minimised outdoor exposure, 
cancelled public gatherings and travel restrictions. Such a quarantine 
measure was equated with a nationwide prevention campaign, calling on 
people to wear masks, wash hands, self-isolate, and refrain from gathering. 
To keep checks, heavy surveillance was adopted.
Third, action-oriented approach with large mass mobilisation, 
as witnessed in terms of: (a) 42,600 medical staff (both civilian and 
military) were dispatched to Hubei from across China.25 Under a 
“pairing-up support” system, 19 provincial-level regions sent medics 
to Hubei and one in 10 Intensive Care Unit (ICU) specialists in China 
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were dispatched to Hubei to treat critically-ill patients.26 (b) In Wuhan, 
86 hospitals were designated to treat COVID-19 patients. While two 
field hospitals—Huoshenshan and Leishenshan—were built in two-
weeks, equipped with 2,600 bed facility. In addition, with 16 public-
facility-turned hospitals, 60,000 beds were set up.27 (c) Factories were 
mobilised to produce medical supplies. Such that China’s output of 
protective clothing surged to 500,000 pieces per day; the daily output 
of N95-rated medical masks rose to 1.6 million and regular masks 
production reached 100 million.28
Fourth, China capitalised on the use of science and technology 
for preparedness, readiness and response. That is, big data, AI and 
robotics were widely used as measures to fight COVID-19. Wherein, 
telecom enterprises used big data to analyse the flow of people and 
tracing the spread of the epidemic by mapping close contacts and also 
ensured timely supply and distribution of medical utilities.29 While 
AI technology has been utilised for no-contact delivery and drug 
selection as well as vaccine development, 5G-empowered robots have 
been used for medical services such as remote care, body temperature 
tests, spraying disinfectants, cleaning and drug delivery.30 Additionally, 
drones have been utilised for temperature monitoring and health 
codes initiated as other ways of “no-contact” measures to reduce the 
risk of transmission.
In its fight against COVID-19, China did set new precedents 
by undertaking strong measures to minimise the risks of infections. 
Wherein, such stringent steps did provide dividends in absence of other 
alternatives, but failed to address the speculation over China’s “hide and 
bide” at the initial stages of the virus outbreak. That is, if China had 
taken precautionary measures on time, the virus outbreak would not have 
evolved in such a large scale and form. 
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Implications of COVID-19: For Xi, It Is a Call for Turmoil 
both Home and Abroad
Given the scale and magnitude of the damage caused by the coronavirus 
outbreak, Xi had posited that “[t]his is a crisis for us [China] and it is a 
big test.”31 This very statement exemplifies the severity of the implications 
attached with China’s COVID-19 crisis, which can be assessed under two 
perspectives—domestic and international. 
At the domestic level, such a crisis in China has affected Beijing’s 
political tradition and mainly has posed a threat to Xi’s “infinite” 
leadership. To argue so: First, changes in China’s political tradition. 
The epidemic disrupted the “Two Sessions”32 or “Lianghui”—the 
gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Plenary Sessions 
and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
National Committee—the biggest political calendar event of China. As 
in late February, Chinese government officially postponed the “Two 
Sessions” to “an appropriate time,”33 as argued to be a “timely policy 
adjustment” to fight the COVID-19 epidemic.34 What makes the delay 
in the Two Sessions significant is that as the Communist Party prepares 
for top leadership changes at its next party congress in 2022, the 2020 
lianghui will definitely shape the political agenda around “Wuhan and 
COVID-19.” This then automatically will act as a pressure point for Xi to 
defend his leadership, and mostly, his handling of the epidemic. 
Second, rise of public discontent against the Party leadership. To note, 
Party chiefs of Hubei and Wuhan, Jiang Chaoliang and Ma Guoqiang 
were replaced by Ying Yong and Wang Zhonglin respectively in light of 
the serious problems exposed in the initial response.35 The reshuffle came 
amidst growing Chinese public criticism of the incompetent handling 
of the coronavirus outbreak. This stringent measure by Xi’s leadership 
reflects the reality of the brimming political instability in China, which 
poses a risk to CPC’s legitimacy. To add further, Dr. Li Wenliang, the 
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whistle-blower of the COVID-19 epidemic parted with saying: “There 
Should Be More Than One Voice in a Healthy Society.”36 The criticality 
to which lies in the fact that being “red” still takes precedence over being 
“an expert,” even in times of crisis. 
In the process, the Chinese government silenced and anyone who 
exposed the failings of the leadership in handling the crisis mysteriously 
disappeared—as Dr. Li faced a severe clampdown by the Party officials for 
“making false comments” alerting of danger. Dr. Li’s death on February 
7 due to the viral infection was the trigger resulting in widespread 
criticism of the government and the call for freedom of speech in China. 
Sensing the increasing public resentment, a team of National Supervisory 
Commission was dispatched to Wuhan to step up measures of surveillance 
and censorship in social media—exemplifying the need for unquestioned 
loyalty to the Party and its leader. This Chinese attitude reflects the 
tendency of putting politics at the helm of affairs, despite the situation. 
Hence, these faultlines in China’s existing monolithic and censored 
political system do call for a paradigmatic change under China’s Wuhan 
experience. Arguably, COVID-19 does push China for a change in its old 
thinking; however, it is hard to assess how the change will unfold. But 
as Minxin Pei argued, the most consequential political implication may 
be the “erosion of support” for the CPC among China’s urban middle 
class.37
Third, the rise of factionalism—a grave threat to Xi’s political legacy. 
China’s political landscape remains divided between two cliques: first, 
the “elitist coalition”—the “princelings” who come from families of 
either veteran revolutionaries or high-ranking officials. And second, the 
“populist coalition”—mainly the “tuanpai,” that is, associated with the 
Communist Youth League (CYL). However, COVID-19 has brought 
to surface the increasing divide amongst the princelings. As evident from 
Ren Zhiqiang, a Chinese realty tycoon and mainly a member of the 
princeling clique, outrightly criticised Xi’s handling of the virus outbreak. 
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Ren called Xi a “clown” in his article titled “An official call to arms against 
Xi: The clown who insists on wearing the emperor’s new clothes.”38 Such 
polemics shared by China’s top leaders reflect the brimming reality of 
Chinese politics, wherein Xi’s political clout is in danger. Adding truth 
to fact, since his criticism of Xi, Ren as noted seems to have mysteriously 
disappeared from the public eye,39 another testament to the Party’s 
crackdown on dissent over the epidemic, as already noted in case of Dr. 
Li. This also brings to light Xi’s increasing paranoia over safeguarding his 
political authority. The increasing opposition to Xi’s legacy is also evident 
in the form of an open letter in circulation, that has been suggesting the 
convening of an extraordinary plenum of the Politburo to reflect on “Xi’s 
wrongs,”40 taking stock of not just handling of the virus outbreak but also 
on his policy decisions since he took charge in 2012; and demanding a 
crucial decision on whether Xi should step down as president, party chief 
and commander of the Chinese military.41
Finally, a dent in Xi Jinping’s image as “Chairman of All Things”—
the biggest setback has been inflicted on Xi’s image, as caused by his 
long absence from China’s political scene during the peak of the virus 
epidemic. Such a political void resulted into Chinese public calling for 
“experts” to take the lead in fighting the epidemic. As noted, Wang 
Qishan, the Vice President who was called upon to take the leading role in 
Wuhan crisis, earned his name as “chief firefighter” in the fight against the 
SARS epidemic in 2003.42 Furthermore, even at the forefront, unlike Xi, 
it was Premier Li Keqiang belonging to the CYL, who was seen steering 
the frontline battle against the virus outbreak, who also holds a record 
of dealing with the SARS epidemic. Also, Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, 
also from the CYL clique was seen overseeing the work in Hubei since 
January. The hands-on approach of other CPC leaders has somewhat cast 
a shadow on Xi’s active role. To which, CPC propagandists in restoring 
Xi’s image have called him the “man of the hour,” “commander-in-chief 
of China’s war against COVID-19.”43 However, it remains indisputable 
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that Xi’s accountability will factor in largely at the leadership change 
during the 20th Party Congress in 2022. 
At the global level, China’s biggest challenge is to repaint its tainted 
global image as a “responsible” actor. On March 26, at the virtual G20 
Leaders’ Summit, Xi delivered a speech titled “Working Together to Defeat 
the COVID-19 Outbreak,” wherein Xi provided a four-point proposal to 
fight the pandemic.44 The proposal called for: (a) resolutely fighting an 
all-out global war; (b) a collective response for control and treatment at 
the international level; (c) support international organisations in playing 
their active roles—a call to support WHO; (d) enhancing international 
macroeconomic policy coordination.45 However, Xi’s s ch an action-
oriented approach comes only after the global damage has been done. 
Here, the big-picture question is: Will China take responsibility for this 
damage? What makes this query pertinent are the ramifications witnessed 
with the spread of the pandemic. That is:
First, at the foremost is the human cost attached to the pandemic. 
Countries such as Italy, despite having the best of medical facilities, 
have witnessed the highest mortality rate. The causal factor being the 
overburdening of health systems in the countries due to rapid increase 
in infection rate, as witnessed in the most powerful countries like the 
US. Such a situation has been a result of four factors:46 (a) lack of initial 
awareness; (b) no adequate timely preparedness to control the spread; (c) 
sudden spike in infec ions after a stalemate; and (d) shortage of medical 
equipment and resources (suc  as masks and ventilators) as well as 
adequate medical force—calling for the spike. Hence, with sustainability 
becoming a prime concern, the inability to combat the virus spread has 
proved that there is no quick fix to the problem.
Second, COVID-19 has caused significant distress to the global 
economy raising alarms of an approaching financial crisis. The rate of 
spread of the contagion has become proportional to the stretch of the 
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impact on the globalised economy. The key disruption has been caused to 
the global demand and supply chain. Assessing the economic risks, OECD 
Report has suggested that the annual global GDP is projected to drop to 
2.4 per cent in 2020 as a whole, from that of 2.9 per cent in 2019, with 
an added negative growth in the first quarter of 2020.47 While the global 
growth is expected to drop to 1.5 per cent in 2020—almost declining 
to half the rate as projected prior to the virus outbreak.48 Not just trade, 
but investments have also been badly hit, as UNCTAD suggested that 
foreign direct investment (FDI) will witness a shrink of 5 to 15 per cent, 
as compared to the earlier forecasted marginal growth for 2020-2021.49 
The sectors that have been greatly hit are: the automotive industry (–44 
per cent), airlines (–42 per cent) and energy and basic materials industries 
(–13 per cent).50 Furthermore, travel and tourism sector is also faced 
with a downturn given travel bans, both inbound and outbound. The 
repercussions of this disrupted economic value chain has also affected the 
energy supply chain. Fuelled by an ongoing price war, COVID-19 has 
hit the global demand for oil and gas resulting in oil prices trickling to 
an unprecedented rate. As Rystad Energy’s report suggested, the global 
oil demand will contract by 16 million bpd in April and 2 billion barrels 
over the year.51 With COVID-19 causing a global economic slowdown, it 
has significantly tarnished China’s global image as a “responsible actor.” 
With these dynamics at play, Xi’s “test” logic fits well. As at the national 
level, with the COVID-19 crisis, the political stakes for Xi are higher 
than ever, especially, to his “infinite r le” under the new constitution 
that allows Xi to remain President beyond his two terms. Undeniably, 
the Wuhan epidemic crisis has shaken China’s domestic stability and most 
importantly, Xi’s absolute power as “Chairman of All Things.” While at 
the global level, the already questioned “responsible” image of China 
has come under severe scrutiny. Hence, only time will decide the fate of 
China and most importantly, Xi Jinping.
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